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A Stochastic Model of Wildfire Ignitions and Damages - Heineke and Weissenberger

A STOCHASTIC MODEL OF WILDFIRE
IGNITIONS AND DAMAGES

J. M. Heineke and Stein Weissenberger
Abstract
A mode l of the production of wildfire ignitions and
damages is developed and used to determine wildland
activity-regulation decisions whjch minimize total expected
cost-plus-loss due to wildfires. Tn tlus context, the implications of various policy decisions are conside red. The
resulting decision rules take a fo rm which makes it possible
for existing wildfire management agencies to read ily adopt
them upon collection of the required data.
In troduction
In one thirteen-day period in 1970, flre burned over a
half-million acres of wildland in Califorrua. Almost 800
homes were destroyed, and sixteen lives were lost as a
direct consequence of this seri es of wildfires. Costs and
losses were estimated at over $200 rrullion, not counting
substantial expected future damage fro m floods and erosion .1
Of course, damage of this extent does not often occur
over such a short peri od of time. Nonetheless, severe con11agra tions occur in California with considerab le regularity ,
and although a combination of demographi c, topographic,
and meteorological factors make California's wildfire problem especially acute, it is for the most part qualitatively
similar to the problem confronting public and private
wildland owners the world ove r. From a broader perspective,
the wi ldfire control problem is a portion of the general
problem of wildland resource management, a problem of
growi ng importance due t o increasing demands on wildlands
for both recreational and residential development.
1Calijom ia Aflame
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£xjsting wildfire control activities may be conven ien tly
categorized as:
1. . Suppression Activity-Direct control of wildfires,
following ignition and detection, through the use of men
and machines.
2. Pre-suppression Activity- Readiness and deployment
of suppression and detection resources.
3. Structure Protection - Reduction of structural loss
through protection of the individmil structure by the use of
fire-resistant vege tation and construction materials.
4 . Fuel Management- Modification of wild land vege tation
by area-wide or strip ("fuel break") conversion to more
fire -resistant fuels. Within this class of activities are "prescri bed-burn" and " let-burn" policies, which are receiving
more attention recently with the recognition of the
constructive role of fire in natural ecosyste ms.
5. Ignition Preventio11 Activities- The use of education,
laws, penalties , inspection, and activity regulation (regulating the number and kind of users in public wildlands) to
reduce the number of ignitions generated in the wild lands .
T o our knowledge, under vi rtually all exjsting fundin g
arrangements, fire suppression activity receives the overwhelming portion of the fire con trol budget. Tt is the
opiluon of many professionals in fire-control orgaruzations
that, partly as a result of these funding arrangements, there
is presen tly a se rious neglect of the non-suppression aspects
of wi ldfire co ntrol. It is in part for t hi s reason that the
present study was initiated.
In tlus study we provide a defmitional and conceptual
framewo rk fo r putting wildfire prevention management on
a badly-needed logical foundatio n. Presently, such manage-
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ment is largely characterized by intuitive judgments and
ad-hoc decisions.2 Unlike suppression activity, which is
justified through an implicit argument fro m "necessity",
adequate levels of funding for prevention activities will have
to be justified thro ugh careful analysis of associated costs
and benefits.
More specifically, in this paper we are concerned with
the subject of fire control through ignition prevention .
A model of man-caused ignition generat ion is developed
which , together with a model for fire damages and decision
cos ts, can be used to determin e prevention decisions that
minimize the expected value o f fire prevention costs plus
fire losses. Although the model can conceptually treat any
fire-prevention decision, it is applied in detail only to the
fi re prevention activity of regula ting the number and kind
of users in a given wild area. Optimal decision rules are
found and a number of their properties and policy implications explored. The model can readily treat decisions

o ther than ignition prevention , such as fuel modification
and structure protection measures, permitting an optimiza tio n to be ultimately performed over a full range of firecontrol decisions.
IGNITION MODEL
The block diagram of Figure 1 describes the process of
fire control, specifically with regard to ignition prevention
decisio ns. Decisions, shown ci rcled , fall into two important
classes.
I. "Control" decisions
a. activity control decisions, involving the determination ofthe number of users, Xi, allowed to engage in activity
i, i = I , 2, ... , n , denoted collectively by the vector ~.3 A
user may be an individual, an organization , or simply an
identifiable activity unit. One user may be engaged in more
than one activity. Examples of Xi are the number of

Figure 1
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campers, off-the-road vehicles, debiis burne rs, children,
in cendiarists, and Joggers (by type of logging activity).
b. other prevention decisions, including de termination
of the type of education and fuel modifica tion to be undertaken and the all ocation to each. Al so includes the type and
severity of penalty for incendiary and negligent fire starts
and the allocation to go into enforcement. These prevention

2A dramatic exa mple is the ext e nsive liter ature o n the use o f ed ucatio nal (e.g. Smokey the Bear) fire-preve ntion programs. Written
al most e ntirely f ro m a socio-psychologica l point of view, systematic
an d con clusive s tudies from an engineering-economic perspective
are nearly no n-existent. (See [2 1 I for an extensive biblioj!raphy o f
such work. For an a nalytical t reatment o f incend iaris m, see 1I 0 ]).
As another example, in (I 7 I the simple a nd unelaborat ed advice is
given that "if the probability o f man -caused fires is high , some
additiona l resources of the unit prohahly shou ld be d iverted t o
patro l and prevention work." It is the purpose of this study to add
detai l, clarity , a nd rigor to s uch prescriptions.

J v ecto rs are denoted b y an underbar.
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decisions are denoted collectively with the vector _g_.
2. Measurement decisions, involving determination of
optimal allocation to activities designed to reduce measurement uncertainty. These decisions specify the degree of
un certainty to be permitted regarding:
a. the "true" state of nature re presented he re by a
generalized fire danger rating, FDR, which in general_has
multiple components. The measu red fire danger rating FDR,
is a random variable and will in general differ from the true
·value. The resulting error will have an associated cost and
hence some benefit will be associated with error reduction.
b. the mean number of ignitions by activity,~. Again ,
costs wi ll be· associated with variance in the measured value

on this physical basis alone without assigning prices to
physical damages.
The ignition model is described schematically in Figure
2. Its output, the probabili ty of k ignitions in activity i,
is conditional on the length of the t ime period T (in days) .
(Time periods of lengt h T in the summer will normally be
associa ted wi th higher ignition probabilities than periods
of the same length in the winter); the number of users by
activity ~;4 the prevent ion state _g; t he ignit ion index I ; the
specific area m (included in m is the distribution of fine, dead
ground fue ls in the area and the ign ition history of the
area); and finally, ignition probabilities may depend upon
the burning index B; and the win d w.S All indices and
states of natu re are initially assumed to be kn own . (See the
Appendix fo r the U .S. Forest Service de fini tion of the
indices f and B.)
Each user in each activity is a potential source of ignitions
through the production of fire brands. The occurrence of
an actual ignition depends on the type of user, the area, the
point in time, the prevent ion state, and the ignitability of
fuels, the latter of which is described by the ignition index.
We assume tha t the jth user in the ith activi ty generates

of~,l.
c. the value of damages and costs.
The ultimate criterion of system performance is assumed
to be the expected value of total fire control cost plus
fire loss (in dollars) and decisions will be taken so as to
minimize this quantity. It should be noted, however, that t he
physical quantities expected fire damage and the numbe r of
fires may be in themselves useful measu res of system effectiveness: Certain inefficien t decisions may be discarded

Figure 2
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Although the burning index does no t describe ign itability, it is
probably highly correlated with t he generatio n o f incendiary ignitio ns
( 14) . (Since incendiarists have t he explicit objective of starting fire s
of significant size, they tend to take burning conditions into acco unt
in making ignitions.) Also no te that W and B will effect contagion
ignit io ns w hich are no t considered ex plicitly as ignitions per se, but
are implicit in the model of damages below.

4The variables Xi will be considered to be continuo us in the subsequen t analysis.

Sa and W are shown as dashed li nes in Figure 2 because they are
conside red to be of minor influence on most ignition sources. Wind
will affect t he spread of fire brands and hence may be s ignificant
only fo r cert ain kinds of activit ies s uch as debris burning I 14].
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ignitions according to the Poisson probability law

For a collection of Xi individuals, the total
number of ignitions in activity i, ki, is the sum of
the Xi independen t random variab les, kij , the
num be r of ign itions produced by each individual:

(1)
where P(kij ;I,m,-) is the probability of k ignitions by the jth
individual in activity i and i\. ij is the mean number of ignit ions
per day for the jth individ ual in the ith activity .7
It is important to emphasize the naturalness of assuming
that kij is Poisson distributed. To this point, recall that two
major axioms must be fulfilled if ( I ) is to accurately
represent the number of ignitions by the jth user in activity
i; First, the number of ign itions in any two non-overlapping
intervals must be independent. Given the particular user and
the ignitability of fuels, there would seem to be little
reason to suspect that the number of ignitions in one period
in any way inOuences the number in another period .8 The
second axiom requires that the probability of one ignition
in a time interval fit be proportional to fit if fit is sufficiently
small, and that the probabili ty of more than one ignition in
this period be approximate ly zero. For the case at hand, this
requirement is readily satisfied .
We now assume that the ignition production of any o ne
individual is statistically independen t of that of other individuals, but possibly dependent on the total number Xi of individuals in the area , i.e.

(2)

i\. ij ='A ij(Xi,l,m,-)

(3)

P(kijlkrs) = P(kij), i, r = l ,2, ... ,n
j = 1 ,2, ... ,Xi
s = 1,2, ... ,Xr

(4)

The probability dist ribution fo r the sum of independent random variables is the convolu tion of the individual probability
distributions .! I Since individual igni tions are Poisson distributed, the distribution of the sum of the kij takes on the
particularly simple form ,l2

(5) P(ki ;Xi,I,m ,-) = e

Aij(t

;

;

·)

=0,1 ,2, ...

Xj

1

(7)

="-i (xi,l,m ,·)

is the mean n umber of ignitions per day fo r activity i as a
function of the number of users of activity i , U1e ignition index, etc. Note that 'Ai(O,I,m,·) = 0. Th e functio n 'Ai may be
estimated from the ignition history by regression analysis.
On a priori grounds, we make the fo llowing assumptions
about the function 1\i:

(10) 'Ai(xi,O,m,·) = 0 and o'Ai/31 > 0
These assumptions are all obvious ones except perhaps for inequality (9), for which there is some evidence. l 3 The following special cases are of interest:
(11)

a2 'A i/c)xi2 = o , .

in which case
'Ai(Xi,l,m,-) = 'Ai 0 (I,m,·)Xi where 3'Ai 0 (I,m,-)jaxi = 0 ; and

6The not ation (") is used to indicate cond it ional variables which are
not given explicit cit ation, e.g. in (I) kij is conditional not only on
1 and m but a lso on q, T etc.
1

k·
('A iT) 1/(ki)! , ki

(6) 'A i = j,E 'Aij(xi,T,m,·)

where krs is the number of ignitions produced by the sth individ ual in activity r. The significance of equations (2) and (3)
is that the expected number of ignitions produced by individual users may depend on the number of users,but that ignition
events are statistically independent from one user to another
across all activities: There is no d irect causal connect ion between an ignition event of one wildland use r and an ignition
event of any other user.9 For instance, people may become
more careful with f ire as more people use a given area, from
the rest raining effect of the surveillance of o thers; or firebrands may be extinguished with grea ter frequency when
there is a higher density of use.l 0

11

-t..-'\
1

where

with

7we assu me ( I ) is stat io nary over the period T , i.e., i\ij(t

Xi
ki = :& ki·
j=l J

writ ing (2) as i\ij = Aij(x,l,m,-): Mean ignit ions in ac tivity
individual j depend upon the n u mber of users in a ll act ivities.

=

·)for a ll t', t " ET.

by

11 See ( 81. p. 248-27 8.

SA possible exception is incendiar y activity by pyromaniacs.

l 2Jbid, p. 252 .

9Again, a possible exception m ight be that past ignition events
actually trigger ignition generation by pyromaniacs.

13 [ 1 s ] as well as various fire prevention exper ts tend to support
this view.

10 A more general specification of this re lationship is o btained by
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also t he case in which

is the conditional ran dom variable total losses in activity i

given ki ignitions. Deletion of the subscript ki on Siki, will be
used to represent the to tal losses in activity i from a random
number of ignitions . (That is, the variable Si is not conditioned on the number of ignitions .) F inally, we define

and hence
2

a rq/ai

2

n

=0 and a 2 r..jfaxi 2 = 0

(J 5) S = ~ Si
i=l

The determination ofA i(xi,l,m,.) for these cases is particularly simple. The function Aio(I,m,-) may be calculated
from th e ignition history of an area simply as
(13) Aio(I ,m,-)

as the total fire losses across all n activities. We first derive the
probability dist ribution of Si, fi(Si), using the fact that the
number of ignitions in activity i, i = 1 ,2, ... ,n, is governed by
the probability law given by equation (5), and then use (15)
to obtain needed information about the density of S, f(S).
In general, the distribution ofloss from the vth ignition in
activity i is conditioned both by decisions which have been
made prior to the period and by the "state of nature." In
particular, we would expect losses to depend primarily upon
fuel modification decisions, 9_, the burn index, B, and the resources which have been allocated to fire suppression in the
area in question ,~- Symbolically, we denote this dependence
as Qiv(div;~,B.~,-), where Qiv is the probability densi ty ofdiv·
l n the analysis that follows it is important that this density
be independent of time, i.e. stationary over the period T . Tn
this period, the major influence of time will be changes in
"burnability" which are induced by weather ch anges. Since
these influences on Qiv are "picked up" by the burn index,
stationarity over T seems to be an acceptable assumption.
If we call hi(S; lki) the conditional density of total loss in
activity i given that there are ki ignitions, then the density of
total losses in activity i is

= Ni(I)/Xi(I)

where Ni(I) is t he tot al number of ignitions due to the jth activity for ignition in dex I and Xi is the total number of userdays in the ith activity, for ign ition index I . Bot h numbers are
calculated for area m, a particular time period, given management po licies, and any other parameters that actively affect
'-i· This procedure will generate a value of"i\i for each value
of T. The collection of these values is an estimate of the function Aio(I ,m,}
Finally, it is important to re -emphasize two of the assumptions which underpin the ignition model :
a. The probability distribution of the numberofignitions
produced by one user in one activity in time period T
is independent of the number of ignitions produced by
any other user in that or any other activity in the same
time period.
b. The probability distribution of the number of ignitions
in any time period T, is independent of the nu mber observed in the preceding period.

t
I

The former assumption rules out phenomena such as pyro maniacal activity triggered by other fi res ,as well as in tensification of an individual's precau tionary activity resulting from
the observation of fires (the one effect is in a sense the converse of the other; both represent modification of ignition
generating behavior as a function of observed fires.) The
latter assu mption rules out significant effects of fire history
onignitability,e.g. the time period Tin the model cannot be
so long that past ignition events begin to affect future ignition events through changes in the ignitability of fuels.

This density is the product of the probability ki ignitions will
occur with the density function of total losses given ki ignitions, summed over all ki ignitions. The function hi(Si I ki) is
readily deducible from the distributions of individual ignition
losses, Qiv(div;q,B,R,.). In particular, hi(Si lki) is the ki fold
convolution ofQiv- with itself.l4
Since the objective of wildland management decision
making has been taken to be minimization of expected cost
plus loss, we are especially interested in the mean of the distribution given in (16). Notice that E(Sj) is a function not
only of the "state of nature" as given by I, B, the distribution
of fuels, etc., but also of the values of the decision variables
Xj,9_, and g. Since expected cost plus loss depends explicitly
on these decision vatiables in the model we have formulated,
it should be possible to detive the ir optimal values fo r various
"states of n ature."
The mean loss in activity i is by definition

FIRE DAMAGE MODEL
In this section, a model of fire damages is derived from our
basic model of individual ignition generations. To begin, we
define the random variable divas the loss associated with the
vth ignition in activity i. If there happen to be ki ignitions in
the period, the losses will be denoted di 1, di2, . . . , diki and
k·1
(14) Siki = ~ div
v=l

1 4see

5
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decisions including entry control, education,
penalty and fuel modification decisions and the
"state of nature." Likewise, E(div) depends upon
suppression activity, fuel modification decisions and the
"burn index. T he simple functional form of expected losses
given in (21) makes the decision opt imization problem especially easy to solve.
Recall that fire losses depend upon the state of prevention
activities, the burn index, the level of suppression, etc., in
which case expected total losses, equation (2 1), for the period Tare

where
(18)

f~ Sihi (Silki)dSi = E(Si lki)
ki
= L E(div)
v=l

Mean losses in activity i are then

n
(22) E(S) = T L J.Li(g_,B,g,.)t- i(Xj,I,m,.)
i=1

00
ki -t--T
k"
(19) E(S) = L L [e 1 (t-iT) 1/ (ki)!] E(div), 1=1 ,2, .. .n
ki=O v=1

where
and from ( 15) the expected total loss over all n activities is
given by
n oo ki
t-·T
k"
(20) E(S) = L L L E(div)e- 1 (XiT) 1/ (ki)!
i=l ki=O v=1

Equation (22) is the basis for the optimization of prevention decisions.ln what follows, we will concentrate on those
prevention decisions which affect Xi .

Since the objective of wildland management was assumed
to be minimization of the expected tota l loss plus cost, expression (20) is the fundamental quantity in the derivation
of decision rules that satisfy this objective. Although (20)presents no difficulties from the point of view of analytic tractability, the implied optimal decision rules are extremely unwieldly and suffer somewhat from lack of straightforward
interpretation. This sit uation can be greatly improved by
assuming that the variables div, v = 1 ,2, ... ,ki are identically
distributed. That is, in a giJ1en area and in a given activity
losses from individual ignitions obey the same probability
law. T his would seem to be a reasonable assumption and
allows equation (20) to be expressed as

REGULATION ENTRY INTO AND
USE OF A WILDLAND AREA
Denote the number of people excluded from activity i by
Yi· Then the cost c(.l'_) of excluding Yi people in activi ty i,
= 1 ,2, ...,n is given by

n
n
n
(24) c(V = L ai(Yi,T,-) + L bi(Yi,T,-) = .L Ci(Yi,T,-)
i= l
i=l
1=1
where ai(Yi,T,.) is the opportunity cost of excluding Yi people
in period T from the ith activityl6 and bi(Yi,T,.) is the ad ministrative cost of the same exclusinn. We now make several
plausible assumptions regarding the forms of these cost functions: that marginal opportunity costs are constant in the
number of users and that marginal administrative costs are
non-increasing in the number of users. That is

n
(21) E(S)=T L '-iE(di)
i=1
where E(ki) = '-iT and E(di1) = E(di2) = . . . = E(div)

=E(di).l5 In words, the total expected loss over the period

of length Tis the expected number of ignitions in activity i,
times the expected loss per ignition in activity i, summed over
all activities. This surprisingly simple result depends upon no
assumption about the distribution of losses from a single ignition, Qiv(div;g_,B,~,.), and is most attractive from a decision
analytic point of view. As we have noted , the Poisson parameter associated with activity i is a function of a number of

and

Note that (25) and (26) imply that
2

I SAs long as areas are relatively ho mogeneous, this assumption will
hold. But, if T were chosen long enough so that areas co uld become
heterogen eous w ith respect to, say, fuels, then the assumption of
identica lly distributed losses will not be va lid. For example, over
long periods of time, the incidence of fires in an area will creat e
dramat ic differences in the distribution of fue ls and hence w ill imply
different loss densities within an area. The way out of this problem
is to choose T short enough to eliminate these effects. Of course, in
principle, if an area beco mes heterogeneous, one need only break it
up in to homogeneous sub areas . See [ 9 ] for a model which yields
essent iall y the same resu lt as reported in equation (2 1).

(27) a

c/al ,;;;;o,i = 1,2, ...n.

The total expected cost-plus-loss entailed in a decision to
pe rmit activity by Xi people is then given by

16The o pportunity cost of excluding t he jth ind ividual from activity
i is defined as the amount individual j would pay to be able t o use
the wild area in question for activity i.

6

A Stochastic Model of Wildfire Ignitions and Damages - H eineke and Weissenberger
n

n

(28) cf>·(i) = ~ cf>j(xi) = E(c+S) = ~ (Ci(Zi-Xi ,T,.)+TJ.Ii\S,B ,~,.)~q(xi,l,m,-))
i=l
i=l

The decision rule given as equation (3 1)
is illustrated schematically in Figure 3.
Note that the rule is always of an all or
nothing sort: either everyone is permitted entry to activity
i or no one is and that the decision criterion is based simply on the diffe rence between the cost of total exclusion and
total admission. These simple results depend crucially on the
convexity properties of the functions Ci and Xi. If these properties are not satisfied, then the appropriate decision rule may
be the one that requires an 0 < XiO < Zi and only partial satisfaction of demand occurs.
An examination of the decision rule (3 1) also reveals the
following interesting features:

where Zi is the demand for the ith activity and Yi =Zi - Xi. The
problem is then to
(29) minimize cf> (~
X

subject to the constraints
O ~x<z

The special structure of cf> (~ considerably simplifies the
solution of (29). Tn particular, from equations (9) and (27),

i) For sufficiently small T, demand is satisfied for the ith
activity, independent of the magnitude of other parameters.l9 This result follows fro m the fact that
Aj (Zi, 0, ·) = 0.

and cf> (f) is convex in ~.1 7 Consequently, there are no local
interior solutions to (29).1 8 Using Xio to represent the optimal admission decision in activity i, we have

(31) XiO={O
Zi

if

[1/>i(O)- cf>i(zi)]

<0

if

[1/>i(O) - cf>j(zi)]

>0

ii) The converse (that no activity be permitted for sufficiently large I) is not necessarily true. There may be
conditions under which demand should be satisfied
for all parameter values. Specifically, this is true if
cf>j

(0) > cf>j (zi)

Figure 3
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1711 is assumed that cf> (?:)€ C .
1

18This stat e ment is not precisely correct. If c/> (x) = 0 for a ll x, every
value of x minimizes cf>. This case is of little intereSt and will be igno red
hen ceforth.

19This result also ho lds fo r sufficiently small B, independent o f all
other paramet ers if J.li (~, 0, ~,.) = 0.
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No te that the rule given as equation (32) does not require
knowledge of the demand for any activity and is time invariant. It is illustrated in Figure 4 for the case where
A. io(T, m, ·) = ai(m , ·)Tand /Ji(g_, B, ~. ·) = /Jio(s_, ~ . ·)B.

for all _g_, B, ~ . ·, etc. That is, the expected damage due
to full activity never exceeds the costs of complete exclusion.
A special, but practically important, case of the decision
ru le given in (31) occurs when cost fu nctions have the following properties:

Tn this case the decision rule is
0 if l > (cio/JJioai)B- 1
(33) Xio =

aCi/ OYi = Cio T and oCj/oT = CioYi ,

Xi if l < (cio/JJioai)B-1
where
This for mulation is particularly easy to use in practice in that
once Cio, /Jio and "-io have been estimated, one needs only the
value of the ignition and burn indices to reach a decision.
Note that in this and in previous cases both Band I must be
considered in making activity regulation decisions. Current
practice appears to base such decisions on the value of the
burning index B alone, which is reasonable to the extent that
B and 1 are closely correlated . However, to the degree that
they differ (d ue for example to wind, topography, or heavy
fuel effects), errors will be introduced into decisions.
The decision rule (33) may be re-formulated in a useful
and interesting fashion. To this end , define the "risk" in activityi , ri , as

acio/OYi = aci 0 / oT = 0; and
oA.ifoxi = "-io where oA. io/OXi = 0 .
Marginal costs with respect to the number of individuals excluded and the length of the decision period are constant and
losses per unit time are linear in the number of users. The decision rule (3 1) then becomes

0 if Cio <J..LiC9.. B, R, ·)"-io(l,m,-)
(31) Xio =

Zi if Cio > J..LiC9.. B, ~. ·)"-io(l,m,-)

(34) ri =J.lioai/Cio ,

Figw-e 4

and the "Fire Load Index" as
(35) Fi = q TB.

DECISION RULE FOR THE jth ACTIVITY

The index Fi has precisely the same form as that recommended in the U.S. Forest Service Fire Danger Rating (FOR) System [17 J ; however, here " risk" has been given a new definition by including the effects of costs and damages. These new
definitions of risk and the Fire Load Index also differ from
the existing ones of the FDR by being computed for each of
the various activities.20
In terms of the new index Fi , equation (35), the decision
rule (33) has the simple form

Cio
I = - - B- 1

/Jioai
(CONSTANT MARGINAL COST, AND
CONSTANT MARGINAL IGNITION GENERATION)

c; 0 =COST PER USER EXCLUDED
Jlio = DAMAGE PER FIRE PER

100

UNIT BURN INDEX
a ; = MEAN NUMBER OF FIRES PER
USER-DAY PER UNIT
IGNITION INDEX

0 if Fi
(36) Xio

=

>1

><

w
0

2::
z

The Fire Load Index Fi is dimensionless and is merely the
cost-benefit ratio

EXCLUSION

0

E

z

expected $ cost + loss per day from admission to
activity i
Fi= ~--------~--~~~~--~~----~~
$ cost per user day from exclusion from activity i

s...:
ENTRANCE

0

B, BURNING INDEX

20The t erm r;l is analogous to the "Occurre nce Index" of the FDR(See t he Appendix fo r more detail.)

100
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Obviously, if Fi > 1 entry for purposes of using
activity i should be prohibited and Fi < 1 implies
all in terested parties should be allowed to use the
area for activity i . Not e that the index Fi h as precise
significance only for activity regulation. For other
fire prevention decisions, e .g. various types of fuel
modification, a procedure iden tical to that we have
followed will yield an index appropriate to the decision in question.
It should be emphasized that use of the Fire Load
Index Fi in place of the more gene ral test given by
equation (3l),is justified only to the extent that the
following approximation s are valid:

The increased cost of the decision given by (38) over the basic optimal
decision rule (31) is readily fo und to be

n

n

(39) ~</> = ~E(c+S) =min { L Ci(Zi,T), T L J..Li(g, B,g,.)A.j(Zi,I,m, -)}
i=l
i=l
n

- _L min {Ci (Zi, T) , TJ..Li (g_, B , ~, ·)Ai (zi,I,m, ·)}
1=1
The cost of the policy given by (37) will be positive unless
decisions under rules (31) and (38) happen to agree, i.e. unless the basic decision rule (3 I) says either prohibit all n activities or permit all n activities (the latter event will occur for
sufficiently low fire danger, although the former will not
necessarily occur for sufficiently high fire danger. Since the
additional cost may be significant ly large, such policies should
be ca refully examined.
For the case where expected cost and loss may be collapsed
into the index Fi (see (36)) decision rule (38) may be written
as

i) The mean number of fires per user day per unit ignition
index in activity i is constant in Xi and I. ( oA.ifo Xi= constant; oA. i/oi =constant)
ii) The mean $cost-plus-loss per fire per unit burning index in activity i is con st ant in B. (OJ..Li/oB =constant)
iii) The cost of prohibiting activit y i per user day (administrative plus opportunity costs) is constant in Xi. (oCj/OXi
= constant)

0 if

n

·r >

n

[ L Ciol L J..Lioai] B -1
i=l
i=l

(40)

n

n

Zi if I < [ L Ciol L J..Lioai] B - 1
i=l
i=1

ENTRY AND USE CONTROL UNDER
HOMOGENEITY CONSTRAINT

This decision rule suggests the following definitions: Let
"overall risk," r, be defined as

Next, we consider a modification of the decision problem
to acco un t for a policy which prohibits the exclusion of
specific users. For example , it is a USFS policy tha t all users
be treated " the same" in the sense that,

n

(41) r

"Closures and restrictions ... should be applied
equally to all forest users, and not to any one category
of visitors,such as hunter, hiker, fishe rman, or logger."

n

=i=1L J..Lioaif i=1L Cio23

and the "overall" Fire Load Index, F, as

(42) F = riB

[1 8] .

Then, the decision rule (40) becomes

This policy can be interpreted as implying the following constraints on decisions:

0 ifF> 1, i = I, 2, ... , n ,
(43) xio

If condition (37) is added as a constraint on t he decision
problem posed in (29), the optimal decision rule is
n
0 , i = 1, 2, ... , n, if L [tf>i(O)- tf>i(zi)] < 0

=

1Zj if F < 1, i = I , 2, . . . , n ,

ENTRY AND USE CONTROL UNDER
BUDGETARY CONSTRAINT

i=I
Let us consider now the more realistic situation where the
fire protection agency o perates unde r budgetary constraints.

n

Zi , i = 1, 2, ... ,n, if L [t/>i(O)- t/>i(Zi)] >022
i=l

22This result follows f rom setting x = ~z and minim izing </>({3)subject
~~ ~ 1 .
-

to the constraint 0
2 1Mor e generally, these constraints might apply o nly to a subset of
the n activities.

n

2 3Note that in general r -=F

L r;.
i= J
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ln general, ifthe process terminates in step 5 with the budget
equality satisfied, there will be some activity Q, 1 .;;;; Q.;;;; k,for
which demand will be partially satisfied,i.e. with 0 <xQ< ZQ.
There wi ll thus be at most one activity with 0 < XQ < ZQ; in
all other activities either Xi = 0 or Xi = zj, that is, either all
other users are either totally excluded or permitted full use.
ln the situation where the optimal decision requires use of
the entire budget, it is of interest to determine the sensitivity
of net costs to increases in the budget allotment, i.e. to determine the shadow price of the budget resource. (The shadow
price is the value of an extra unit of resource, the dollar
amount by which total cost will be decreased through the expenditure of an additional dollar of budget. In the situation
where the optimal solution does not require the whole budget,
clearly the shadow price of the budget will be zero.) Consider
the cas~ of partial regulation where the optimal decision requires 0 < XQ < ZQ for some l .;;;; Q .;;;; k.;;;; n. Then, a simple
calculation shows that the shadow price ofb, ai/J* /ab, is given
by

We consider for simplicity the linear case whose unconstrained solution is given by (36). Let the total maximum administrative budget ava ilable for activity regulation during
a time period T be given by bT, where b is a positive
constant. Then the basic cost minimization problem (29) is
modified simply by the addition of one more constraint on
the activity vectorS this constraint can be written as the inequality
(44) b 'x - d0
- 0 -

;;:. 0

,

where b = [b 0 1 , b 0 2, ... , b 0 n] is a vector of (constant)
- 0
administrative costs of activity exclusion per user day , and
d 0 =b 'z - b is the difference per day between the adminis- otrative costs of total exclusion and the total available budget.
Clearly, if d 0 .;;;; 0, the available administrative resource is
sufficient to exclude all users in all activities, and the previous
unconstrained sol utio n (36) remains valid. Assume then that
d 0 >O.
We can rewrite the basic cost minimization problem (29)
as

(46) ai/J*/ab = - cQo(FQ - I)/bQ

minimize 1/J (~
(45)

where 1/J* is the optimal cost.

X

ERROR SENSITIVlTY
subject to the

constraints~;;:.~;;:.

0
It is of considerable interest to determine the effects of
various uncertainties and measurement errors on the optimal
decision rules which were derived above. 1n this section we
assess the effect of errors in measuring the Fire Load Index,
Fi_24 To this end, let Fi be the measured value of Fi . The
measurement error t.Fi is then given by

To simplify the statement of the solution of ( 45), let us also
rewrite the (linear) cost function 1/J as
1/J (~

= T 5:_ 0 '!:.. + T _g_'~

where _g_' = [Cl o(F I - l),C2o(F2- 1), . . . ,cn 0 (Fn- 1)]
is a vector of total net cost per user day in each activity.
This problem is a standard linear programming problem,
but of such simple structure that the following elementary
algorithm readily produces its solution:

1.

Take~=~·

Examination of the optimal decision rule (36) shows that a
decision error will be made whenever

>I

and Fi < 1

(48) Fi
which always satisfies the constraints.

< 1 and Fi

2. Label activities so that gi ;;:. gi+ 1 for all i. Let Fi;;:.
and, consequently, gi;;:. 0 fori= I , 2, . .. , k ..;;n;let
Fi < 1 for i > k. Then, keep Xi= Zi fork <i ..;;n, and
subsequently, consider only i = I, 2, . .. , k. Starting
with XJ,

>

1

A simple calculation further shows tha t the error cost M>i
(the cost associated with an erroneous decision) is given by
(49) M>i = CioZiTI I - Fil.
The error costs (49) occur only for values of Fi and Fi, which
satisfy (48). To interpret these results, suppose that measurement errors are bounded by €i, i.e.

3. decrease Xi until either
4. Xi = 0 , in which case repeat step 3 for Xi+ 1, until i + 1
= k, or

24Recall that "costs and losses" may be collapsed into Fi when marginal costs wit h respect to the nurr:ber of individuals excluded and the
length of the decision period are constant and losses per unit time are
linear in the number of users.

5 . -b 0'x- - d 0 = 0, in which case the process is terminated.
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any attempt to test (and, for that matter, use) a model lies
in the quality and quantity of available data. In particular,
data is needed by area on the number of use rs by activity, the
number of ignitions and the ignition index for given areas and
given time intervals. This information would al low estimation
of the functions Xi via regression analysis. In addition, data
on fire losses (by area) as a functio n of the level of prevention
and suppression activities and the burn index would besufficient for estimation of t he functions 11i· Finally, informat ion is needed on the cost of administeling an entry and use
control program (for estimating t he functions bi) and on the
opportunity costs of excluding people from wild areas (fo r
estimation of the functions ai). There would seem to be no
inherent difficulty in collecting data on these variables with
the possible exception of the fire damage and "opportuni ty
cost" categolies.25
The basic problem in estimating the opportunity cost of
exclusion or the value of an area burned is essentially the
same: Public wildland use (by activity) is for the most part
not market priced and hence observations on prices and volumes needed to estimate the relevant functions (demand functions) do not exist.26 In these cases, proxy variables for
market transactions are used as an ind irect means of determining the appropriate values. See [ J , 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11 , 12 ,
16, 20] for examples of this procedu re. Since examples are
plentiful, we pursue the point no furt her.

Then, from (48) and (49) we have that
CioZiT€i for
max !:::.1/>i.

={

0

I J - Fi 1,;; Ei

for I I - Fi I> Ei

where max !:::.1/>i. is the maximum cost associated with a
measurement error in Fi and therefore

M>i ,;; max f:::.</>i
Hence, the opti mal decision rule (36) has two desirable properties with respect to measurement errors in Fi : (1) Maximum
error costs may be made arbitralily small by making measurements sufficiently accurate; and (2) error costs are zero for
sufficiently large Fi. Thus, relatively inaccurate measurements may give satisfactory results for the conditions of
most interest (high fire danger).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have examined the logical framework of
a class of decisions confronting fire protection agencies using
expected cost plus fire loss as the measure of system performance. More specifically, we analyzed fire prevention de cisions under the "cost plus loss" criterion. The decision
problem was formulated for an arbitrary prevention activity
and then solved for a particular activity, controlling entry
into and use of a wild area. Optimal decision rules were
presented under a number of different assumptions about
system parameters and several types of institutionally imposed constraints. Since syste m parameters are a function
not only of the number of use rs by activity but also of the
level of all other prevention activities, the same basic procedure we have used will generate optimal decision rules for
any other prevention activity.
It should be emphasized that the optimal prevention
decision rules presented here are solutions to a sub-optimization within the overall fire-control decision problem and
hence no inferences are possible from our analysis concerning the redishibution of wildfire management resources
between fire suppressio n activity and fire prevention activity.
Almost certainly optimal wildfire management will involve
a mixture of fire suppression and fire prevention activities,
with the specific mixture depending upon a number of local
characteristics of the area protected. Determination of the
activity mix and its dependence upon these cha racteristics is
considerably beyond the scope of the present study. Quite
obviously, the central concept in such a determination is the
shadow price of reso urces in fire su ppression activities vis a
vis their shadow price in fire prevention activities.
Use of the ideas presented here as a basis for making entry
and use decisions, of course, awaits verification of the model.
And as is often the case, the major problem encountered in
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Use is made t hroughout the pa per of certain measures of
ignition and bu rning properties of vegetative fuels; we
briefly describe these measures here. Extensive details may
be found in [17).
The Na tional Fire Dange r Rating System was recently
proposed to provide a uniform national system for measuring the state of vegeta tion vis vis expected wildfire incidence and severity. We make use of the following components of this system here: The ignition index f ("ignition
component" in f1 7]) "is a measure of the ease with which
fuels may be ignited. It is function of the percentage of fine
fuels which are living, the moisture content of the dead
portion , and the fuel temperature. The burning index B is
intended as a measure of the "potential amoun t of effort
needed to contain a fire in a particular fuel type within a
rating area." Specifically, it estimates the flame length
based on a model of fuel distribution, and is a measure of
the rate of fire spread. lt is a function of fuel type, fuel
moisture, win dspeed, slope and tempera ture. Risk r is not
well defined, but is meant to be proportional to the expected
number of fires during a given period of time. The occurrence index is proportional to the product rl , and is
considered to be " related to the potential fire incidence
within a rating area." The fire load index F is proportional
to the product rm and is considered to be "related to the
total amount of effort required to contain all probable fires
occurring within a rating area during a specific period."
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